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Abstract
Psychologists and behavioral economists have documented that individuals often make in-
tertemporal choices that are inconsistent with the conventional economic model. To explain
intertemporal choices better, psychologists have oﬀered, and provided experimental support
for, a “willpower depletion” model which predicts that a person who exerts self-discipline in
one activity will behave as if he has less self-discipline available to exert in other activities.
We formalize a willpower depletion model and investigate how willpower constraints aﬀect the
canonical problem of how to divide a cake (or paycheck or workload) over time to maximize
utility. We ﬁnd that a consumer behaving optimally subject to willpower constraints acts in
ways that others have described as anomalous. This consumer reveals a preference for increasing
paths of consumption, a preference for commitment, and time-inconsistency in preferences. We
also study the optimal allocation of willpower between the intertemporal saving activity and
other activities that require self-discipline. Finally, we show how the ability to build willpower
by its exercise further inﬂuences the optimal path of consumption.
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Although consumers making intertemporal choices are conventionally modeled as maximizing
an exponentially-weighted sum of additively-separable, stationary utilities, psychologists and be-
havioral economists have recently pointed out that, in both the ﬁeld and the laboratory, people
behave in ways that model cannot explain. For example, people often prefer increasing sequences
of consumption and, when commencing a new project, often prefer to get some hard work out of
the way at the outset. In addition, in many settings consumers seem to exhibit time-inconsistent
behavior and to procrastinate severely. Time and Decision (2003) edited by George Loewenstein,
Roy F. Baumeister and Daniel Read, constitutes an up-to-date catalogue of such “anomalies.” Most
of the contributions suggest, as the editors note, that “the road to understanding intertemporal
choice is not through developing better discount functions but through understanding the variety
of psychological processes that enter in to future-based decision making ....” (Loewenstein et al.,
2003).
One chapter in this collection surveys experiments conducted by Baumeister and colleagues over
a decade to test the so-called “willpower depletion” or “strength depletion” model. According to
this model, if a person exerts self-discipline in one activity, he behaves as if he has less self-discipline
available to exert in other activities. Even if these activities are completely unrelated, therefore,
how a person behaves in each of them is linked.
Anecdotes consistent with the existence of such linkages come readily to mind. It is common-
place that people quitting smoking violate their diets. People often temporarily abandon diet or
smoking regimes when preparing for an exam or an important presentation. Proﬂigate spending or
drinking to excess is often the “reward” for a hard week at work, even when that work generated
no extra wealth.
Baumeister and his colleagues have gone beyond such anecdotes, however, and demonstrated
such linkages experimentally. Their experiments have two phases. Every subject in the experiment
participates in the second phase but only a subset of the subjects, randomly selected, participates
in the ﬁrst phase; the remainder is used as the control group. In the ﬁrst phase, subjects are asked
to perform some task that depletes their willpower; in the second phase, their endurance in an
entirely unrelated activity is measured. For example, in the ﬁrst phase subjects have been asked,
while reporting every thought that occurs to them, to suppress thoughts of white bears. This nearly
impossible task of thought suppression–which reportedly preoccupied Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and
other Russian writers (Wegner, 1994)–erodes a subject’s willpower; when asked in the second phase
to solve insoluble anagrams or geometric puzzles or to squeeze the handgrip of a muscle exerciser,
these subjects give up long before their counterparts in the control group. The experiments have
1used a variety of other ﬁrst-phase activities to erode willpower. Besides thought suppression,
subjects have been asked to regulate their emotions, to divert their attention from movie subtitles,
to restrain their appetites in the presence of tempting food, and so forth. As Baumeister and
V ohs summarize the results: “...our ﬁndings very consistently supported the willpower theory–
that is, performing a ﬁrst act of self-regulation weakened people’s ability to regulate themselves
subsequently. This pattern was found repeatedly, with many diﬀerent manipulations and measures
of self-regulation.” (Baumeister and Vohs, 2003.)
Recently, willpower depletion has also been shown to have eﬀects on impulsive buying. In one
experiment (Vohs and Faber, 2004) members of the treatment group were given the standard task of
suppressing thoughts of white bears, paid $10, dismissed and then oﬀered the immediate opportu-
nity to purchase items from the campus bookstore displayed on a table in the lab. A control group
which was also given $10 and the same opportunity, did not have to tax themselves with thought
suppression. Subjects in the treatment group chose to buy more items and to spend more total
dollars than their counterparts in the control group. Reviewing this and other studies, Baumeister
wrote “Self-control research seemingly has much to oﬀer researchers interested in consumer behav-
ior... [T]he processes that undermine self-control should lead to more buying and more impulsive
buying.” (Baumeister, 2002.)
Given the experimental and anecdotal evidence that a willpower constraint may have important
economic implications, and given the fact that, in the absence of such constraints, maximization
of the conventional objective function cannot explain a set of observed behaviors, it is natural
to consider how behavior in the conventional formulation would change if willpower constraints
were introduced. In this paper, we formalize a willpower depletion model and investigate how
willpower constraints would aﬀect the canonical problem of how to divide a cake (or paycheck
or workload) over a ﬁxed time horizon to maximize utility. In our formulation of the cake-eating
problem, the greater restraint the consumer exercises the faster his willpower erodes. In addition, to
capture Baumeister’s view that “further persistence demands ever greater exertions of willpower,”
(Baumeister et al., 1994) we assume that a given level of consumption depletes willpower at a faster
rate when a person’s reserves of willpower are lower.
A consumer behaving optimally subject to binding willpower constraints will act in ways that
others have characterized as “anomalous.” For example, even with positive discounting, the agent
may prefer a path of consumption which increases over time. Equivalently, if the consumption good
is leisure, the consumer may prefer to work hard early and enjoy more leisure as time passes (al-
though, beyond some point, the agent must work incessantly to accomplish what he has deferred).1
1Fischer (2001) ﬁnds that the discount factor required to explain procrastination in a model where geometrically-
2Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) and others have observed preference for improving sequences in the
laboratory, even among agents who–when asked which of two items they want to consume ﬁrst–
prefer the one generating the larger utility. Such behavior could be exhibited by the consumer in
our model.
The modiﬁed model may explain other “anomalies” as well. The existence of savings clubs
which hold a person’s money and, for a fee, dole it back to him gradually over time has been
regarded as inconsistent with the standard model. But our consumer would strictly prefer to have
his “cake” or paycheck doled out to him by a “savings club” rather than have the entire amount
available in his wallet where he would need to use up scarce willpower to resist spending it. Indeed,
he would be willing to pay a fee for this service.
As is well-known, time-inconsistent behavior cannot occur in a model where a single agent maxi-
mizes exponentially discounted, additively separable utilities. Suppose, however, that to verify this
theoretical prediction experimentally we interrupted our consumer in the middle of his optimal
program, administered a short questionnaire, and let him re-optimize starting with the cake re-
maining. His behavior would change because his eﬀort to complete the questionnaire would deplete
his willpower. Since willpower is unobservable, this change in behavior would have the appearance
of time-inconsistency.
We also consider the allocation of willpower between this intertemporal saving activity and
other activities (e.g. cramming for exams, training for musical performances, or preparing an
important presentation) that require self-discipline. We show that the optimal allocation almost
never results in consumption smoothing over the entire horizon, even when it is feasible. Moreover,
this formulation permits us to investigate how two agents, who diﬀer only in the size of their initial
cakes, would choose to consume in the ﬁrst phase if they recognized that utility from the alternative
activity depends on the amount of willpower held back during cake eating. We provide an example
where the poorer agent consumes at the same rate as his richer counterpart, until his smaller cake
runs out, and then transfers a larger stock of willpower for use in the alternative activity. We thus
show how the poor may, in some domains, appear to exert less self-discipline, not because they
have diﬀerent preferences, willpower endowments or self-discipline technology but merely because
they are poor.
Finally, we consider the intuitive idea that the exercise of self control in the present, while
depleting willpower, may also build willpower reserves in the future. We ﬁnd that the opportunity
to build future willpower by constraining current consumption distorts the intertemporal proﬁle
discounted, additively-separable utility is maximized is unrealistic; our model generates procrastination (zero con-
sumption of leisure for the ﬁnal phase of the planning horizon) for any discount rate.
3of consumption; renewable willpower creates a time preference even when the consumption would
have been constant (when positive), were willpower non-renewable.
Our paper contributes to the recent literature on the economics of self-regulation. See, e.g.,
Laibson (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), Gul and Pesendorfer, (2001), Benhabib and Bisin
(2004), and Bernheim and Rangel (2004). Relative to the literature, our analysis is distinguished
by an explicit model of willpower depletion and regeneration, a focus on the dynamics of willpower
management, and a detailed consideration of the optimal allocation of willpower across competing
activities. We oﬀer further discussion of the self-regulation literature, and our contribution to it,
in section 6.
In the next section we present our model of consumption over time with limited willpower and
derive and interpret the ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing the optimal program. Section 3 de-
scribes qualitative properties of the optimal program including behavior exhibiting time preference
in the absence of time discounting. In section 4 we study the optimal allocation of willpower across
multiple activities. In section 5 we analyze a model where willpower is renewed by the exercise
of self-discipline. Section 6 discusses the related economics literature. In section 7 we show how
relationships central to our predictions can be illuminated by new experiments. In section 8 we
conclude.
2 Consumption with Limited Willpower
In the canonical cake-eating problem in continuous time, a consumer maximizes his discounted
utility by choosing his consumption path c(t) over a ﬁxed horizon (t ∈ [0,T]). We denote the size
o ft h ec a k ea tt i m et as R(t) and assume that R(0) is given. The rate of decline in the cake at t
(denoted − ˙ R(t)) is, therefore, c(t).
We depart from the canonical model by assuming that the agent is endowed with a given
stock of willpower W(0) a n dd e p l e t e si tw h e nh er e s t r a i n sh i sc o n s u m p t i o n . W ed e n o t et h er a t e
of willpower depletion as f(W(t),c(t)). Allowing this depletion function to depend on willpower
reserves captures Baumeister’s observation that the same restraint depletes willpower at a faster rate
when one’s willpower reserves are lower. Because neither experiments nor introspection suggests
t h es i g no ft h er e l a t i o n s h i p ,w ea s s u m et h a tf (·) is not aﬀected by the stock of cake remaining
(R(t)).2
An important feature of willpower depletion is that as long as even a morsel of cake remains, one
has to use willpower to consume nothing. But consuming nothing requires no willpower when there
2Assuming f (·) is not a function of R(t) simpliﬁes our analysis. If, however, f were increasing (decreasing) in
R(t), we conjecture that this would mitigate (reinforce) the agent’s incentive to increase consumption over time.
4is nothing left to eat. We refer to this as the “fundamental discontinuity of willpower depletion”and
take account of it in our formulation.3
In anticipation of the analysis in Section 4, we assume that any willpower remaining after the
conclusion of intertemporal consumption is used in an alternative activity and generates additional
utility m(·).
Since the agent is not permitted to choose a consumption path which results in negative
willpower, the willpower constraint may preclude the path which exhausts the cake while equal-
izing discounted marginal utility up through T. We refer to that path, which is the hallmark of
the canonical model, as “perfect smoothing.” Even when perfect smoothing is feasible, the agent
may choose to forgo it. Our goal throughout is to investigate how the presence of the willpower
constraint alters the agent’s chosen consumption plan relative to the predictions of the canonical
model.
2.1 Formulation of the Model
















−f (W (t),c(t)) if R(t) > 0
0,o t h e r w i s e
R(T) ≥ 0,W(T) ≥ 0
R(0) = R ≥ 0
W (0) = W ≥ 0
where ρ is the subjective rate of time discount and t0 =s u p{t ∈ [0,T]:R(t) > 0}.N o t et h a tt h e
law of motion for willpower is discontinuous reﬂecting the fundamental discontinuity of willpower
depletion discussed above.
We make the following assumptions on the willpower technology f and the utility function U.
We assume that, for all W, f (W,c) > 0 for c ∈ [0,¯ c) and f (W,c)=0for c ∈ [¯ c,∞) for some
¯ c>0. While following a given consumption path, if the willpower stock becomes zero before time
T, consumption must weakly exceed ¯ c thereafter. Therefore, this assumption guarantees that the
3This discontinuity would persist even if f (·) were a function of R(t) so long as lim
R(t)→0
f (·) > 0. While it would
simplify our analysis if the discontinuity conveniently disappeared in this way, there is no reason to expect that it
does. Therefore, we show how the optimal consumption path can be determined even when the discontinuity remains.
5set of feasible consumption paths is nonempty. We also assume that f is strictly decreasing and
weakly convex in c for c ∈ [0,¯ c) and weakly decreasing in W. Thus, we assume that the more the
agent restrains his consumption, the faster he depletes his willpower reserves; moreover, the same
level of restraint may result in faster depletion of willpower if the agent’s reserves of willpower are
lower. We also assume that f is twice diﬀerentiable everywhere except at ¯ c and continuous at ¯ c
and fcW ≥ 0. We assume U (0) = 04,U(c) is diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
We are interested in modeling non-addictive behaviors like those considered in the experiments by
Baumeister and colleagues; so U (c) is a function only of contemporaneous consumption, and not
past consumption.
We now consider a related, but more tractable problem and argue that, by solving it, we solve
problem (P1). In the related problem, the agent chooses both an optimal consumption path c(t)









W (t)=−f (W (t),c(t))
R(s) ≥ 0,W(s) ≥ 0
R(0) = R ≥ 0
W (0) = W ≥ 0
In problem (P1), the optimal consumption path either ﬁn i s h e st h ec a k ea tt i m et0 <T ,or it
does not. If the cake is exhausted at time t0 <T ,then the law of motion governing the depletion
of willpower jumps to zero, and for any time t ∈ (t0,T], ˙ W (t)=c(t)=0 . T h e s es a m ep a t h s
of consumption and willpower could be achieved in problem (P2)b yc h o o s i n gs = t0, and would
generate the same payoﬀ. Similarly, if in the original problem (P1) the cake is not exhausted before
time T (R(t) > 0 for t<T), these paths of consumption and willpower could also be achieved in
the related problem by choosing s = T,and would generate the same payoﬀ. Since the two problems
share objective functions and laws of motion up to time s = t0, any program that is feasible in the
original problem is also feasible in the related problem and will generate the same payoﬀ.
Given that any consumption path that is feasible in problem (P1) is also feasible in problem
(P2), if the optimal consumption path in problem (P2) is feasible in problem (P1)t h e ni ti sa l s o
optimal in problem (P1).5 As u ﬃcient condition for any consumption path in problem (P2)t ob e
4As long as U (0) > −∞, we can always renormalize the utility function U so that U (0) = 0.
5To see this, suppose that the optimal consumption path in problem (P2) is feasible but not optimal in problem
6feasible in problem (P1) is that the consumption path depletes the cake by time s (R(s)=0 ).
After all, that consumption path generat e st h es a m ew i l l p o w e rp a t hu pt ot i m es in both problems
and therefore W (t) ≥ 0 up to time s. After time s in problem (P1), willpower remains constant
(at W (s)) since cake is depleted. Hence any such consumption path is feasible in problem (P1)a s
well.
To see that the optimal consumption path in (P2) exhausts the cake at time s, suppose the
contrary–that the “optimal” program leaves R(s) > 0 cake uneaten at s. To dominate this program,
consider a diﬀerent program that duplicates the “optimal” consumption path up to time s − ∆,
for any ∆ > 0, and consumes
R(s)
∆ more during the remaining interval of length ∆.T h i se x h a u s t s
the cake, draws willpower down to the same level at s − ∆ and depletes less willpower during
(s − ∆,s). Indeed, one can always choose ∆ small enough that
R(s)
∆ ≥ ¯ c. In this case, depletion of
willpower during (s − ∆,s) ceases altogether. Not only would utility from the alternative activity
be weakly larger than on the “optimal” path but utility from intertemporal consumption would be
strictly larger. This follows since the alternative consumption path is uniformly higher throughout
and strictly higher from time s − ∆ to s. This contradicts the claim that any feasible path with
R(s) > 0 can be optimal. Hence, without loss of generality, we can conﬁne our attention to problem
(P2).
The Hamiltonian for problem (P2)i sg i v e nb y
H (c(t),R(t),W(t),t,α(t),λ(t)) = e−ρtU (c(t)) − α(t)c(t) − λ(t)f (W (t),c(t)).
To reduce notation, we shall refer to this Hamiltonian as H (t) when no confusion arises. The
ﬁrst-order conditions are:
c(t) ≥ 0, e−ρtU0 (c(t)) − α(t) − λ(t)fc ≤ 0 and c.s. (1)
˙ W (t)=−f (2)
˙ α(t)=0 (3)
˙ λ(t)=λ(t)fW (4)
T − s ≥ 0,H (s) − ρe−ρsm(W (s)) ≥ 0 and c.s. (5)
R(s) ≥ 0,α (s) ≥ 0 and c.s. (6)
W (s) ≥ 0,λ (s) − m0 (W (s)) ≥ 0 and c.s. (7)
(P1). Then there is a strictly preferred consumption path that is feasible in problem (P1). But by our earlier
argument this path is also feasible in problem (P2) and would dominate the program we claimed was optimal in
problem (P2) .H e n c ew eh a v eac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
7It should be noted for future use that, whenever willpower is strictly positive, consumption
varies continuously with time. This result follows because (1) the Hamiltonian is strictly concave
in c; (2) α and λ vary continuously with time when W (t) > 0;( 3 )U0 is continuous in c;( 4 )fc is
continuous in both c and W;a n d( 5 )W varies continuously with time.











Consuming at a slightly faster rate at time t generates two marginal beneﬁts and one marginal cost.
The direct marginal beneﬁt is that the utility ﬂow at time t increases by e−ρtU0 (c(t)). The indirect
marginal beneﬁti st h a t−fc units of willpower are saved for every unit of additional consumption
and the increased willpower has a value of λ(t) (in terms of utils at t =0 ). The marginal cost of
consuming at a faster rate at t is the utility lost (α(t)) because the additional cake consumed at t
can no longer be consumed at some other time. At an interior optimum (c(t) > 0), the sum of the
two marginal beneﬁts equals the marginal cost.
It is also instructive to interpret (4), which indicates that the imputed value of additional
willpower at t (λ(t)) weakly declines. When fW =0 , willpower is equally useful no matter when
it arrives and so its imputed value is constant. But when fW < 0, additional willpower is more
valuable the earlier it arrives because the rate of depletion of willpower slows from the moment the
additional increment arrives. In that case, ˙ λ(t) < 0.
In the presence of willpower constraints, consumption may vary over time even in the absence
of time discounting. Henceforth, suppose ρ =0 . If c(t) > 0 for t ≤ s, then by condition (1)
U00 (c) ˙ c = ˙ α + ˙ λfc + λfcc˙ c + λfcW ˙ W
= λfWfc + λfcc˙ c − λfcWf




U00 (c) − λfcc
¤
= λ(fWfc − fcWf)
⇐⇒
˙ c = λ(t)
fWfc − fcWf
U00 (c) − λ(t)fcc
(8)
Since U is strictly concave in c while f is weakly convex in c, the denominator of the right hand
side of equation (8) is strictly negative. So if λ =0 , equation (8) yields the classical conclusion
that consumption is constant as long as it is positive. On the other hand, if λ>0, then when
c(t) > 0, ˙ c T 0 as (fcWf − fWfc) T 0. Intuitively, consumption increases over time if and only if
8the indirect marginal beneﬁt of additional consumption increases over time: d
dtλ(−fc) > 0. In that
case, the direct marginal beneﬁt must decrease over time and this entails increasing consumption.
3 Optimal Consumption When Willpower Has No Alternative
Use
We consider ﬁrst the case where willpower has no alternative use besides the regulation of in-
tertemporal consumption (m(W) ≡ 0). When willpower can only be used to regulate intertemporal
consumption, perfect smoothing is optimal whenever feasible. Intuitively, when perfect smoothing
is feasible, there is no shortage of willpower and λ(t)=0for t ≥ 0. In the absence of discounting,
perfect smoothing implies that consumption is constant over time for t ∈ [0,T].
More generally, Proposition 1 describes the qualitative properties of the optimal consumption
path when ρ = m(W)=0 .
Proposition 1 Let WH be the minimum level of initial willpower such that setting c(t)=R
T for
t ∈ [0,T] is feasible. Denote the optimal consumption path as c∗ (t).I f W ≥ WH then the cake
is exhausted, and c∗ (t)=R
T for t ∈ [0,T]. If W<W H then both the cake and willpower are
exhausted (R(s)=W (s)=0 ) , and when consumption is strictly positive it is strictly increasing
(resp. constant, strictly decreasing) if and only if fcWf − fWfc is strictly positive (resp. zero,
strictly negative).
Proof. From (3) α(t) is a constant function, and with a slight abuse of notation we denote this
constant as α ≥ 0.
First assume W ≥ WH. C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r eλ(t)=0for all t ∈ [0,s]. Since U0 (·) > 0,
(1) requires α>0 and c(t) constant. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote this constant as
c ≥ 0. Since α>0, (6) requires R(s)=0 . Since R(0) = R>0, then c>0. If T −s>0, (5) would
require U (c) − U0 (c)c =0 . But since U0 (·) > 0 and U00 (·) < 0 this can not occur for c>0. It
follows that when λ(t)=0for all t ∈ [0,s] then s = T and c = R
T . By deﬁnition of WH,W(T) ≥ 0.
Thus (7) is satisﬁe d .T h i sp r o v e st h eﬁrst statement in the proposition.
Now assume W<W H. Then λ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0,s],for suppose to the contrary that λ(t)=0






n=0 fW(W(n),c(n))dn > 0 for all t, λ(t)=0for some t ∈ [0,s], implies that λ(t)=0for all
t ∈ [0,s]. But as seen above the conditions above then imply that c = R
T which is infeasible when
9W<W H. So if W<W H then λ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0,s], and by (7) W (s)=0 . To satisfy (1)
with U0 (·) > 0 and −λfc > 0 requires α>0; and, again, since α>0, (6) requires that the cake is
entirely consumed (R(s)=0 ). In this case, by our earlier observations, (fcWf − fWfc) T 0 for all
t ∈ [0,s] i fa n do n l yi f˙ c T 0 for all t where c(t) > 0. This concludes the proof of the proposition.
To illustrate, consider any act of will function of the following form:






sign(˙ c)=s i g n
¡
−K0gKg0 + K0g0 (A + Kg)
¢




Since g is strictly decreasing and K is weakly decreasing, there are two possibilities. At any t where
c(t) > 0, ˙ c =0if K0 =0and, if K0 < 0 then ˙ c T 0 as A T 0.
4 Optimal Consumption When Willpower Has Alternative Uses
We next consider the case were willpower may have an alternative use besides the regulation of
intertemporal consumption (m(W) > 0). In particular, we assume that m(·) is strictly increasing
a n dw e a k l yc o n c a v e .
Our investigation of this case is motivated by results in experimental psychology which indicate
that when subjects appear to have nearly exhausted their willpower, they in fact are holding
willpower in reserve for future activities. In one experiment (Muraven, 1998), some subjects were
given two tasks to be performed consecutively and some were told in advance that a third task
would follow the ﬁrst two. When performing the second task, those who anticipated the third task
gave up sooner and thus appeared as though they had less willpower.
As shown in the previous section, when willpower has no alternative use, the agent smoothes
his consumption perfectly whenever that is feasible. That is, whenever ¯ W ≥ WH,c (t)=
¯ R
T
for t ∈ [0,T]. D e n o t ep e r f e c t l ys m o o t hc o n s u m p t i o na scH. When willpower has alternative uses,
however, perfect smoothing may be avoided even when feasible. In order to identify conditions
10suﬃcient for perfect smoothing to be avoided, we assume throughout this section that W>W H.
To isolate the inﬂuence of willpower concerns we will continue to assume ρ =0 .
To ﬁnd conditions suﬃcient for perfect smoothing to be suboptimal, we determine when c(t)=
cH for t ∈ [0,T] violates one of the necessary conditions for an optimum. Denote by ˆ W the willpower
available at T if perfect smoothing (cH) has been implemented; clearly ˆ W depends on the initial
levels of willpower and cake ( ¯ W, ¯ R) but we suppress this dependence for simplicity.





Multiplying both sides by cH we get,
h




cH = αcH. (9)
Solving (9) and substituting into (5), we obtain:
U (cH) −
h






















with equality if s<T.Deﬁne mH(W,c)=
U(c)−U0(c)c
f(W,c)−fc(W,c)c. Then, we can rewrite (10) as
λ(T) ≤ mH( ˆ W,cH). (11)
with equality if s<T.
4.1 A Necessary Condition
As the following proposition makes clear, the agent almost never chooses to smooth perfectly
when willpower has an alternative use:
Proposition 2 Perfect smoothing is almost never optimal. Speciﬁcally, the agent chooses to
smooth perfectly only if
(1) fWfc − fcWf =0 ,f o rc =
¯ R
T , W ∈
h
ˆ W, ¯ W
i
, and
(2) m0( ˆ W) ≤ mH( ˆ W,cH).
Proof. If smoothing is optimal then c(t)=
¯ R
T , implying ˙ c =0and c(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0,T). Since




> 0, w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a t
λ(t) > 0 for all t ≤ T. It then follows from (8) that perfect smoothing requires fWfc − fcWf =0
where f(·,·) and its partial derivatives are evaluated at c =
¯ R
T and any W ∈
h
ˆ W, ¯ W
i
. This




> 0, (11) requires
m0( ˆ W) ≤ mH( ˆ W,cH), conﬁrming condition (2) of the proposition.
It should be emphasized that while necessary conditions (1) and (2) of Proposition 2 are ex-
tremely restrictive, they may be insuﬃcient to insure perfect smoothing. Even if they hold, the
agent may ﬁn i s ht h ec a k eb e f o r et i m eT and consume nothing for the remainder of the time horizon.
We conclude this section by noting a surprising implication of the theory. Suppose the poor
and the rich have the same preferences over consumption proﬁles, the same initial endowment of
willpower, and the same willpower technology (f = K(¯ c − c)). Assume, moreover, that the rich
and the poor have the same constant marginal utility (m) if additional willpower is used in the
alternative activity. The poor are assumed to diﬀer from the rich in only one respect: the poor
have smaller cakes.
Then, by Proposition (1), optimal consumption paths are constant for both rich and poor as
long as consumption is strictly positive. To distinguish whether a variable pertains to the poor
or the rich, we append a subscript “p”o r“ r”, respectively. Thus, for consumption we write ci
(for i = p,r). Since, in this example, members of each group have the same utility function and
self-control technology, the function mH(·,·) is identical for the two groups and there is no need to
add the subscript i. Assume that, for i = p,r, m > mH( ˆ Wi,c H,i). Then, by Proposition (2), the
optimal consumption path does not involve perfect smoothing. Since consumption is constant and
exhausts the cake, si <Tand ci >c H,i, for i = p,r.
Since, by assumption, both the rich and the poor carry some willpower into the second activity,
additional willpower must have the same marginal utility in the two activities and, from (7),
λi(si)=m. However, since si <T, (11) requires that λi(si)=mH(Wi,c i). Hence,
mH(Wi,c i)=m for i = p,r. (12)
Since the left-hand side of (12) is independent of its ﬁrst argument and strictly increasing in its
second argument, this equation deﬁnes the same consumption for the two groups: cp = cr as long
as both consumptions are positive. Since the poor have strictly smaller cakes ( ¯ Rr > ¯ Rp),t h e y
must run out of cake sooner (sp <s r), after which their consumption drops to zero. Having started
with the same willpower and having exercised the same restraint over a shorter time interval,
the poor will have more willpower remaining to invest in the alternative activity (e.g. athletics):
Wp(sp) >W r(sr).6
6If ¯ W is reduced suﬃciently, only the poor will carry willpower into the alternative activity, contrary to the
assumption in the text. In this case, the rich will consume at a faster rate than the poor (cr >c p)a sl o n ga st h e
consumption of each group is strictly positive, and the imputed value of using additional willpower in consumption
will exceed the value of using it in the alternative activity (mH(Wr,c r) >m ).
12The poor in this example may appear to a casual observer to have less willpower (smaller
¯ W) than the rich or at least to have less ability to control visceral impulses (larger f functions).
Consuming as rapidly as the rich despite smaller paychecks while conserving scarce willpower for
athletic or other activities may even seem self-destructive and requiring better skill in personal
management. But in fact, the behavior of the poor is optimal and the only policy intervention in
this example which can improve their welfare is an increase in initial cake ( ¯ R).
5 Optimal Consumption When the Exercise of Willpower Creates
More Willpower in the Future: the Muscle Model
I nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n sw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tw i l lpower is non-renewable. Common intuition
and experimental psychology indicate, however, that willpower can be built up if it is exercised.
Indeed, it can be built up in one arena and then used to advantage in other arenas. A striking
example of this is the self-discipline that body builder and governor Arnold Schwarzenegger brings
to public speaking. According to Vanity Fair, before Arnold Schwarzenegger delivered his speech
at the Republican Convention “staﬀers had been startled to see him give a ﬂawless performance of
the speech, then repeat it exactly minutes later.” When asked about that, Schwarzenegger replied
“I rehearse like that with everything I do. I had already rehearsed it dozens of times...For me, it is
like reps.” p.160 (Jan. 2005).
Governor Schwarzenegger may be on to something. Experimental psychologists have also found
that, while exerting self-control depletes willpower over the short term, regular exercise of self-
restraint may eventually build willpower. In one experiment (Muraven et al., 1999), subjects who
participated in two-week self-control drills (regulating moods, improving posture, etc.) later showed
signiﬁcant increases in the length of time the would squeeze a handgrip relative to those who did
not participate in the drills.
In this section, we introduce the notion that, like muscle, the prior exertion of willpower may
strengthen the ability to self-regulate i.e., slow down future depletion of willpower. We will see
that muscle management introduces variation in consumption over time even when willpower itself
does not. To this end we introduce a third state variable, muscle, the level of which is denoted by
M (t). We augment our earlier model in two ways. First the rate of change of willpower is given
by ˙ W (t)=γM (t) − f (W (t),c(t)). As before, willpower is depleted by restraining consumption,
f (W (t),c(t)), but this depletion is moderated by the service ﬂow γ from the stock of muscle,
M (t). Since the stocks of willpower and muscle cannot jump, the only way to alter the rate
of willpower depletion immediately is by altering contemporaneous consumption. In the future,
13however, the muscle may develop and provide additional willpower at rate γ.T h er a t ea tw h i c h






The idea is that exercising willpower today contributes to one’s future muscle but the contributions
decay.















f (W (t),c(t)) − σM (t) if R(t) > 0
−σM (t),o t h e r w i s e
(14)
R(t) ≥ 0,W(t) ≥ 0,M (t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0,T] (15)
R(0) = R>0,W(0) = W>0,M (0) = M>0
Once again we consider a related, but more tractable problem and argue that, by solving it, we
solve problem (P3). In the related problem, the agent chooses both an optimal consumption path





subject to the constraints of problem (P3) except constraints (13)-(15) which are replaced by:
˙ W (t)=γM (t) − f (W (t),c(t))
˙ M (t)=f (W (t),c(t)) − σM (t)
R(t) ≥ 0,W(t) ≥ 0,M (t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0,s]
A sb e f o r e ,w em u s ta r g u et h a tt h em o r et r a c t a b l ep r o b l e mw eh a v ef o r m u l a t e dh a st h es a m e
consumption path for t ∈ [0,s] as the solution to the actual problem (P3). Once again this will be
the case if we can show that in problem (P4) the entire cake is consumed by t = s in the optimal
solution. Our previous argument suﬃces. If R(s) > 0 in the optimal program then M(s) > 0 and
W(s) ≥ 0. But then we could choose ∆ small enough that
R(s)
∆ ≥ ¯ c. We could then duplicate the
proposed optimal path until s − ∆ and augment it by
R(s)
∆ in this ﬁnal interval. The payoﬀ would
be strictly higher and the program would be feasible since the willpower left at s − ∆ is the same
in the two programs (W(s − ∆) ≥ 0) and no willpower is depleted in the ﬁnal interval.
14Having established that the solution of our related problem (P4) solves the actual problem
(P3), we make two observations which simplify the analysis. Since the muscle is initially positive
and decays exponentially even if it is never augmented, muscle will be strictly positive and will at
no time violate the nonnegativity constraint. Moreover, since the stock of cake can only decline,
requiring that it is nonnegative at s insures that it will be nonnegative previously.
Given that for t ∈ [0,s) t h e s et w os t a t ev a r i a b l e sm u s tb enonnegative, we can simplify our
formulation by replacing R(t) ≥ 0 and W (t) ≥ 0 by R(s) ≥ 0 and W (s) ≥ 0. However, since
W(s) ≥ 0 no longer implies that W(t) ≥ 0 for t<s , the conditions which must necessarily hold at
an optimum whenever W(t) > 0 will diﬀe rf r o mt h o s et h a th o l dw h i l eW(t)=0 . Given our focus,
we consider only the former situation in detail.7 The Hamiltonian for this problem is:
H (c(t),R(t),W(t),t,α(t),λ(t),π(t))
= e−ρtU (c(t)) − α(t)c(t)+λ(t)(γM (t) − f (W (t),c(t)))+
π(t)(f (W (t),c(t)) − σM (t)).
The ﬁrst order conditions are given by,
c(t) ≥ 0, e−ρtU0 (c(t)) − α(t) − (λ(t) − π(t))fc ≤ 0 and c.s. (16)
˙ W (t)=γM (t) − f (17)
˙ M (t)=f − σM (t) (18)
˙ α(t)=0 (19)
˙ λ(t)=fW (λ(t) − π(t)) (20)








T − s ≥ 0,H (c(s),R(s),W(s),s,α(s),λ(s),π(s)) ≥ 0 and c.s. (22)
W (t) > 0 and c.s. (23)
R(s) ≥ 0,α (s) ≥ 0 and c.s. (24)
W (s) ≥ 0,λ (s) ≥ 0 and c.s. (25)
M (s) ≥ 0,π (s) ≥ 0 and c.s. (26)
7To derive conditions which must hold across both cases, Seierstad and Sydsœter (1987), and also in Léonard and
Long (1992)) begin by forming the Lagrangean H +Θ(t)W(t), where Θ(t) is a Lagrange multiplier. In such problems
the multiplier (λ) on the state variable (willpower) may jump discontinuously as the nonnegativity constraint is just
reached or as it becomes slack. If that multiplier does jump, then consumption would jump as well at such dates.





F i r s ta s s u m et h a tγ/σ ≤ 1. In this case, we show that each of the preceding terms is weakly positive
while ˙ λ and ˙ π are weakly negative. These results can be most readily understood using the phase
diagram depicted in ﬁgure (1). Provisionally assume that fW < 0 and γ>0. Then we can plot the
locus of (λ,π) pairs such that ˙ λ =0 .B yt h e˙ λ equation (20), these points lie on the 450 line π = λ.
Horizontal motion above this locus is to the right and below it is to the left. Similarly, we can plot
the locus of (λ,π) pairs such that ˙ π =0 .B yt h e˙ π equation (21), these points lie on a ﬂatter ray
provided
γ
σ < 1. In the extreme case where
γ
σ =1 , the two rays coincide. Vertical motion above the
˙ π =0locus is upward and below this locus it is downward. As long as muscle exists at any time in
the program, some will remain at the end (M(T) > 0), because it at most decays exponentially and
therefore never reaches zero. It follows from condition (26) that the endpoint condition π(T)=0
is satisﬁed. As long as willpower considerations matter (λ(0),π(0) 6=0 ),the endpoint condition
and dynamics preclude initial multipliers set ato ra b o v et h el o w e ro ft h et w or a y ss i n c et h e n˙ π ≥ 0
implying π(T) > 0. Thus π(T)=0requires that the initial multipliers be set below the lower of
the two rays. But this in turn implies that λ − π>0,
γ
σλ − π>0, ˙ λ<0, and ˙ π<0.
Now consider the case where γ/σ > 1, depicted in ﬁgure (2). The endpoint condition π(T)=0 ,
together with these dynamics imply that there will be a ﬁnal phase in which the multipliers will lie
strictly below the ˙ λ =0locus, and thus, again, λ − π>0,
γ
σλ − π>0, ˙ λ<0, and ˙ π<0.
The optimal consumption path in the muscle model shares some qualitative features with that
in the model without muscle. First, the cake is entirely consumed. To see this, note that having
assumed U0 (·) > 0 and fc < 0, and shown (λ − π) > 0, we can satisfy (16) only if α>0; and then
(24) requires that the cake be exhausted by time s. Second, for every initial level of muscle there is
a willpower level W ˜ H above which the optimal path entails perfect smoothing. This is true because,
for every initial stock of muscle there is an initial stock of willpower suﬃciently large such that the
Hotelling path is feasible and therefore optimal. Indeed, if the initial muscle level is large enough,
the agent will be able to achieve perfect smoothing without any initial willpower. Intuitively, in
any case where perfect smoothing is feasible, there will be no shortage of willpower or muscle and
λ(t)=π(t)=for t ≥ 0.
In the more interesting cases, if we start with an initial level of willpower suﬃcient for perfect





reduction in the initial stock of willpower will make the perfectly smooth path infeasible. Since
λ(0) ≥ 0, we know that utility is increasing in the initial stock of willpower. Because perfect
smoothing is the optimal path in the absence of willpower concerns path, it follows that such a
path is infeasible for any W (0) <W˜ H.
Next, we ask how recognition that the exercise of willpower builds muscle alters our conclusions
16about the time path of optimal consumption in the absence of discounting (ρ =0 ). Intuitively, since
condition (16) holds for s<T ,the sum of the direct and indirect marginal beneﬁts of increased
consumption must remain equal to α at all times. Hence, if consumption is strictly increasing over
time, which would depress the direct marginal beneﬁts of consumption, then the indirect marginal
beneﬁts ((λ − π)(−fc)) must also be strictly increasing. More formally, diﬀerentiating condition
(16), we obtain:
U00 (c) ˙ c = ˙ α +
³
˙ λ − ˙ π
´
fc +( λ − π)
³
fcc˙ c + fcW ˙ W
´
=( fW (λ − π) − (πσ − λγ))fc +( λ − π)
³
fcc˙ c + fcW ˙ W
´
=( λ − π)
³
fWfc + fcc˙ c + fcW ˙ W
´





(λ − π)(fWfc − fcWf)
∆
+
muscle service ﬂow z }| {














where ∆ =[ U00 (c) − (λ − π)fcc] < 0. The inequality follows because c maximizes the Hamiltonian.
If λ(t)=π(t)=0for t ≥ 0, equation (27) yields the classical result that consumption is constant
as long as it is positive and equation (22) requires that it be positive until T.
To clarify how muscle building inﬂuences the time path of optimal consumption when perfect
smoothing is infeasible, we consider two special cases where, in the absence of muscle, the optimal
consumption path is particularly simple. Speciﬁcally, we consider ﬁrst the case where the rate of
willpower depletion is determined only by rate of consumption and not by the willpower remaining
(fW =0 ) , and second the case where (fWfc − fcWf)=0 . In each of these cases, when muscle is
absent, optimal consumption is constant until some time s when consumption drops to zero.
Referring to equation (27), case 1 (fW =0 )implies that both the direct willpower eﬀect and
the muscle service ﬂow are absent. The time path of consumption is therefore determined only by
muscle building. First consider the case where muscle decays at a faster rate than it contributes
to willpower [(γ/σ) ≤ 1]. In this case, the muscle building term of equation (27) is always positive
(see Figure (1) and the associated discussion). Thus when (γ/σ) ≤ 1 and fW =0 ,consumption
is always increasing. Relative to the optimal path in the absence of muscle, the ability to build
willpower through its exercise leads the agent to bear down at the beginning of the program in
order to enjoy a greater willpower later.
When muscle decays more slowly [(γ/σ) > 1], more complex consumption paths may emerge.
If the multipliers λ and π are initial located in regions II or III of Figure (2), optimal behavior has
the same qualitative features as when (γ/σ) ≤ 1.Consumption is always increasing. If, however,
17the multipliers are initially located in region I of Figure (2), consumption will decrease with time
until the multipliers pass into region II. That is, the consumption proﬁle is ∪ - shaped.
Referring again to equation (27), case 2 [(fWfc − fcWf)=0 ]implies that only the direct
willpower eﬀect is inactive. Relative to the optimal path in the absence of muscle, the ability to
build of willpower with exercise again induces time preference. Consider, for example, a situation
where the initial muscle stock is zero (M (0) = 0),and thus, at the beginning of the program, the
muscle service ﬂow term is inactive. In the beginning of the program, optimal behavior in this case
is like that in the case where fW =0 . For example, when (γ/σ) ≤ 1,consumption will increase in
these early stages of the optimal path.
6 Contribution to the Economics Literature
We have introduced into the standard economic model of intertemporal consumption the intu-
itive idea that the ability to self-regulate is a depletable resource. The existence of this resource is
supported by more than a decade of psychology experiments. Given that this resource–commonly
dubbed “willpower”–is scarce, self-regulation today aﬀects choices tomorrow even if the choice set
tomorrow is ﬁxed. Having completed our analysis, we wish to explain how our work contributes
to the literatures on self-regulation. We discuss the behavioral economics literature in this section
and the experimental psychology literature in the next section.
One strand of the literature on the economics of self-regulation (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 1999) focuses on the present-biased choices which result from hyperbolic discounting while
another strand (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001, 2004a,b; Benhabib and Bisin, 2004; Dekel, Lipman and
Rustichini, 2005) models self-control problems which arise from temptation costs. In the hyperbolic
discounting models, when an individual’s preferred level of consumption in the present exceeds the
level to which he would have liked to commit earlier, his prior selves never have any direct control
over the amount his present self consumes. On the other hand, the decision-maker in temptation-
cost models always has perfect control over consumption although he must pay a temptation cost if
he wants to consume less than what his “other self” would prefer. In our model, the decision-maker
has perfect control as long as any willpower remains but has virtually no control when willpower
is exhausted. On the issue of control, therefore, our willpower model steers an intermediate course
between the extremes envisioned in the hyperbolic discounting and temptation-cost approaches.
However, both models fundamentally diﬀer from ours: neither predicts, for the consumption of
non-addictive goods,8 that current acts of self-regulation inﬂuence future choices from a given
8There is a related literature (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Laibson 2001) concerning self-regulation when the good
consumed is addictive. The agent in these models is assumed to have perfect self-control in a cool state but none
18set of options. Hence, neither formulation can account for the behaviors induced repeatedly by
Baumeister and his colleagues in their laboratories.
Nor can the model of Benabou and Tirole (2004) explain these behaviors. Benabou and Tirole
consider the role of state-dependent self-regulatory ability on optimal decision making. Their
paper identiﬁes the ability to self-regulate with the degree of present-bias in time discounting, and
focuses on the eﬀects of imperfect recall and self-reputation on optimal choices. Despite its potential
importance in other contexts, imperfect recall cannot plausibly explain the ﬁndings of Baumeister
and his colleagues in their laboratories since no experiment lasts more than a few hours.
In a recent working paper, Fudenberg and Levine (2005) model an agent whose long-run self
may, at a direct utility cost, exert control over the choices of a sequence of short-term selves. They
explicitly rule out by assumption (Assumption 5) the existence of a depletable cognitive resource
like willpower, but discuss how their model might be altered to accommodate such a resource.
Several contributors to this literature treat self-regulation as having a direct contemporane-
ous utility cost. In discussing an appropriate formulation to capture Baumeister’s experiments,
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004) regard the exertion of willpower as generating disutility al-
though Loewenstein (2000) regards the matter as an open question. Whether or not willpower
depletion has a utility cost seems diﬃcult to resolve empirically. What we have resolved analyti-
cally, however, is that including the stock of willpower (or its rate of change) in the utility function
is not necessary to capture either the behaviors psychologists have documented in their laboratories
or to explain a number of prominent “anomalies” behavioral economists have reported in the ﬁeld.
For these purposes, it is suﬃcient to append to the conventional formulation of intertemporal utility
maximization the additional constraint that the consumption path chosen must not overexhaust
the agent’s willpower.
7 Implications for Psychology Experiments
Because our theory of intertemporal consumption relies on the series of experiments performed
by Baumeister and his colleagues over more than a decade, we are well-positioned to suggest how
relationships central to our predictions can be illuminated by further experimentation.
Both introspection and evidence from the laboratory indicate that lowering consumption results
in a hot state. By changing current consumption, the agent may alter the probability that he enters the hot state,
thereby indirectly exerting future self control. Such models are not intended to explain behavior in the experiments
of Baumeister and his colleagues, which do not involve addictive goods. Moreover, since the good in our model is
assumed to be nonaddictive, its consumption is not well-captured by state-dependent utility with a persistent state.
Self-control in our model is direct and current choices aﬀect future choices only through their eﬀect on willpower.
19in faster depletion of willpower, so we assumed fc < 0 throughout our analysis. Since experimental
evidence leaves ambiguous whether a given restraint on consumption results in faster or unchanged
depletion of willpower when willpower reserves are lower, we took both possibilities into account:
fW ≤ 0. However, since neither experiment nor introspection suggests how the amount of cake
left uneaten at a given point aﬀects the rate of willpower depletion (holding constant the level of
restraint and the willpower stock) we assumed as a simpliﬁcation that willpower depletion at time
t is independent of cake remaining then. We now describe two experiments which would illuminate
the issues which remain ambiguous.
To determine whether a given level of restraint depletes willpower more rapidly when willpower
reserves are low, we propose the following variation on Baumeister’s two-phase experiments. In
the ﬁrst phase, subjects would be asked to perform a quantiﬁable willpower-depleting activity (A),
such as attempting to solve an insolvable puzzle. In the second phase, the same subjects would
be asked to perform another, quantiﬁable willpower-depleting activity (B). The treatment group
would perform activity A before B, and the control group would perform B before A. All subjects
would be informed ahead of time about the nature of the two activities and the order in which they
would be performed. If the level of willpower reserves does not aﬀect its rate of depletion (fW =0 )
the two groups should, on average, last as long on a given activity regardless of whether it precedes
or follows the other activity. On the other hand, if depletion is anticipated to be more rapid when
reserves are low, the subjects should restrain themselves more with a given activity when it occurs
ﬁrst: that is, they should squeeze the handgrip longer when it is ﬁrst and quit sooner when it is
last; similarly, they should quit the puzzle later when it is ﬁrst and sooner when it is last.
To assess whether a given level of restraint depletes willpower more rapidly when the cake
available is larger, we propose the following variation on Baumeister et al. (1998). Upon entering
the lab, all subjects would be seated in front of a plate of edible, but not particularly tempting,
food such as radishes or bran cereal. Subjects in the treatment group would also have a plate with
a speciﬁcn u m b e r(X) of cookies in front of them. The controls would be asked to take a speciﬁed
amount of time to taste the untempting food and would write down their impressions of it. The
treatment group would be told that they had been randomly assigned to taste the untempting food
and would be instructed not to eat any of the cookies. This group would also be asked to take
t h es a m es p e c i ﬁed amount of time to write down their impressions of the food consumed. In a
second phase of the experiment, both treatment and control groups would be asked to perform an
easily quantiﬁable, endurance task such as squeezing a handgrip or solving an insolvable puzzle.
Baumeister et al. (1998) implement this design with a ﬁxed number (X) of cookies. In their
experiment, none of the subjects in the treatment consumed any of the cookies and there is a
substantial and statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence on the second task between the endurance of the
20treatment group and the control group. Our proposed innovation is to vary the number of cookies
(X). If, holding consumption ﬁxed (at zero in this case), the rate of willpower depletion depends
on the size of the remaining cake, then we would predict that the diﬀerence between treatment and
control groups in performance in the second phase should depend on X. That is, willpower should
be more or less depleted by consuming no cookies, depending on how many cookies were available.
An attractive feature of this design is that the tempting X c a nb ev a r i e db ys m a l la m o u n t si nt h e
neighborhood of widely diﬀerent X’s. We conjecture that when X is large, small changes will have
no eﬀect on willpower depletion; when X is small, such changes seem more likely to aﬀect willpower
depletion although, the sign of the inﬂuence is not obvious ap r i o r i .
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has explored the consequences of including in a conventional model a cognitive
constraint well-documented by experimental psychologists: depletable willpower. Speciﬁcally, we
assumed that if a consumer has wealth to spend on current consumption and yet he does not spend
it all, then exercising self-restraint requires an act of will that depletes his ﬁnite stock of willpower.
This willpower constraint captures the common notion, veriﬁed by laboratory experiments, that
an individual has limited, though positive, capacity to regulate his own visceral or unthinking
behaviors. Willpower in our model may be interpreted as a cognitive resource which must be
depleted to exercise self-restraint.
A consumer who spends his entire budget on current consumption expends no willpower since
what restrains him from spending more is an empty wallet. Hence, the willpower constraint has
no eﬀect on consumer behavior in a one-period “static” problem. To investigate how the willpower
constraint aﬀects intertemporal behavior, we introduced it into the conventional model of economic
decision-making over time. In that model, a cake (or paycheck or stock of leisure time) must be
consumed over a ﬁnite time horizon.
A willpower-constrained consumer behaves in ways that have long puzzled economists. Willpower
concerns may induce paths of consumption that are increasing until wealth is depleted, at which
point consumption drops to zero. This provides one possible explanation for otherwise puzzling
forms of procrastination where the time path of consumption of leisure features both some front-
loading of work, and some extreme backloading as well. Speciﬁcally, if the consumer must complete
a project by deadline T and foresees that completing the work will take him T − ¯ R days, then he
will have ¯ R days of leisure to allocate prior to the deadline. A willpower-constrained consumer may
choose to work hard at the outset, getting part of the task out of the way before enjoying increasing
amounts of leisure as time passes; when only T −s days remain, however, his consumption of leisure
21stops altogether and he works nonstop, completing the project on the instant of the deadline. Even
with mild discounting, increasing consumption paths followed by zero consumption would persist
as the optimal program.
When the consumer has other activities besides intertemporal consumption which beneﬁtf r o m
self-discipline, another surprising result emerged: the optimal allocation of willpower almost never
results in perfect smoothing of consumption over the entire horizon, even when willpower reserves
are suﬃcient to permit such smoothing. To illustrate, we presented an example where neither
the rich nor the poor smooth over the entire horizon. In that example, the poor consume at the
same rate as the rich until their smaller paychecks are exhausted and then use their larger stock of
remaining willpower on alternative activities. While such behavior might suggest to some a need
for training courses in self-discipline, personal management, and planning for the future, in fact
that intertemporal behavior is optimal given the smaller paychecks of the poor.
Finally, we considered what would happen if the exercise of self control in the present, while
immediately depleting willpower, also builds willpower reserves in the future. We found that the
ability to build future willpower by constraining current consumption further alters the intertem-
poral proﬁle of consumption. Speciﬁcally, renewable willpower induc e sat i m ep r e f e r e n c ee v e nw h e n
consumption would have been constant, if willpower had been nonrenewable.
A willpower-constrained consumer will demonstrate other behaviors that economists have often
viewed as anomalous. Such a consumer would respond in surveys that he prefers one consumption
path but would then pursue a diﬀerent consumption path. He would value not having to exercise
self-restraint and would, therefore, pay to participate in savings clubs and “fat farms” that help
their customers restrain consumption. He would also make impulsive purchases after willpower
reserves had been depleted. A willpower-constrained consumer would also appear to have time-
inconsistent preferences. For example, if asked in the morning if he would like a large salad or a
cheeseburger for lunch, the consumer might order the salad; but after a morning of problem solving
that proved more diﬃcult than anticipated, lunch time arrives and the willpower depleted consumer
chooses the cheeseburger.
In sum, our analysis suggests that a number of “anomalies” of intertemporal choice can be
explained without abandoning the standard economic model in which a consumer maximizes an
exponentially-weighted sum of additively-separable, stationary utilities. Rather, a modiﬁed model,
based on experimental psychology and acknowledging that restricting consumption requires both
economic and cognitive resources, may explain otherwise anomalous behaviors. Indeed, the fact
that these anomalous behaviors are so frequently observed may be interpreted as ﬁeld evidence con-
sistent with the “willpower depletion” model that Baumeister and colleagues have found evidence
for in the lab.
22As our analysis has shown, the shape of the intertemporal consumption proﬁle depends in
theory on characteristics of the willpower depletion function. If our theory is correct and if further
laboratory work succeeds in determining the characteristics of this function, then the information
could be used to sharpen predictions of intertemporal consumption.
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